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Peck v. Zipf, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 108 (Dec. 28, 2017)1 
 
TORT LAW: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
 
Summary 
 
 Under NRS 41A.071, a plaintiff’s malpractice claim must be dismissed if the claim is not 
accompanied by an expert affidavit, but NRS 41A.100(1) states that the expert affidavit need not 
be submitted if the medical malpractice claim is argued under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. 
Because the appellant failed to prove that the instrument left in his body was the result of surgery, 
the claim was properly dismissed in that the claim did not satisfy the elements to permit the 
statutory exception of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Likewise, NRS 41A.071 does not violate the 
Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses as applied to inmates or indigent people. 
 
Background 
 
 Frank Peck, an inmate at High Desert State Prison in Indian Springs, was admitted at Valley 
Hospital in December 2013 under the care of Dr. David R. Zipf and Dr. Michael D. Barnum. 
Following his release, Peck claimed that he discovered a foreign object under the skin of his left 
hand, alleging that the doctors left a needle in his hand. Peck cited NRS 41A.100(1)(a) which states 
that expert testimony may not be needed in medical malpractice claims if the alleged harm “is a 
matter of common knowledge of laymen”.2 Peck, though, failed to argue that he indeed did have 
surgery. Thus, the district court granted summary judgment as Peck did not satisfy the 
requirements to invoke NRS 41A.100(1). Because he did not satisfy the requirements to invoke 
the res ipsa exception to the medical affidavit requirement and failed to include the medical 
affidavit with his malpractice claim, the claim was properly dismissed under NRS 41A.071. 
 
Discussion 
 
 On appeal, Peck contends that the expert affidavit was not necessary under NRS 
41A.100(1)(a). Furthermore, he argues that NRS 41A.071 is unconstitutional in that it violates his 
equal protection and due process rights. Ultimately, the court disagreed with Peck’s contentions 
and affirmed the district court’s decision. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
 The district court may grant summary judgment “when material facts are not in dispute and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”.3 Thus, this court will accept the factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and view them in a light most favorable to nonmoving party.4 
The district court’s dismissal will be reviewed de novo. 
 
                                                 
1  By Jeff Chronister. 
2  Fernandez v. Admirand, 108 Nev. 963, 969, 843 P.2d 354, 358 (1992). 
3  Bonicamp v. Vazquez, 120 Nev. 377, 379, 91 P.3d 584, 585 (2004). 
4  Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 227–28, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). 
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NRS 41A.071’s affidavit requirement applies to Peck’s complaint 
 
 NRS 41A.071 requires that a medical malpractice claim be accompanied by an expert 
affidavit and if the claim does not include it, the claim shall be rendered invalid. However, the 
expert affidavit requirement can be superseded if the claim falls under one of the enumerated res 
ipsa loquitur exceptions recognized in NRS 41A.100(1). Peck did not include an expert affidavit 
in his claim, and the claim will thus be rendered void unless it falls into one of the exceptions. 
 NRS 41A.100(1)(a) states that the expert affidavit is unnecessary if a “foreign substance 
other than medication or a prosthetic device was unintentionally left within the body of a patient 
following surgery”. However, he failed to discuss the medical procedure or allege that the 
instrument left in his body occurred as a result of a surgery. NRS 41A.100(1)(a) does not define 
surgery. Since the statute did not define surgery, the court considered the plain and ordinary 
meaning of a word to reach the conclusion.5 Black's Law Dictionary defines surgery as "that branch 
of medical science which treats of mechanical or operative measures for healing diseases, 
deformities, disorders, or injuries".6 NAC 449.9743 defines "surgery" as "the treatment of a human 
being by operative methods". The court held that the intravenous needle is not an “operative 
method”, and Peck’s claim did not satisfy the NRS 41A.100(1)(a) res ipsa loquitur exception. 
 
NRS 41A.100 codified and replaced the common law res ipsa loquitur doctrine 
 
 Peck also contended that the expert affidavit is unnecessary under the common law res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine. However, the Nevada Legislature codified the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and 
determined that an expert affidavit is necessary except for in the instance of one of the enumerated 
exceptions of NRS 41A.100(1)(a)-(e). The Nevada codification intended to replace the common 
law res ipsa loquitur doctrine rather than merely supplement it.7 The language of the statute is clear 
that NRS 41A.100(1)(a)-(e) refer to res ipsa loquitur exceptions in surgery, not other procedures. 
Allowing the common law res ipsa loquitur doctrine to supersede the codified NRS 41A.100(1)(a) 
would take the bite out of the statute and render it meaningless. The court denied this argument 
and affirmed the district court’s use of the statute rather than the common law doctrine. 
 
NRS 41A.071 does not violate equal protection or due process 
 
 Peck argued that the expert affidavit requirement is in violation to his equal protection and 
due process rights, citing that NRS 41A.071 1) creates an unfair distinction between medical 
malpractice plaintiffs and regular negligence plaintiffs, 2) prevents indigent people from having 
the opportunity to pursue their claims, and 3) makes it more difficult for inmates to prosecute 
medical malpractice claims. Statutes, though, are presumptively valid and a plaintiff who 
challenges a statute must shoulder the burden of proof and demonstrate the invalidity.8 When the 
law does not implicate either a suspect class or a fundamental right, then the statute need only be 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.9  
 
                                                 
5  Jones v. Nev., State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 4, 342 P.3d 50, 52 (2015). 
6  Surgery, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
7  Johnson v. Egtedar, 112 Nev. 428, 433, 915 P.2d 271, 274 (1996). 
8  Tam v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 80, 358 P.3d 234, 237-38 (2015). 
9  Zamora v. Price, 125 Nev. 388, 395, 213 P.3d 490, 495 (2009). 
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No unconstitutional distinction exists 
 
 The right to pursue medical malpractice claims is not supported as a fundamental right.10 
Likewise, Peck failed to argue that a suspect class is implicated because of NRS 41A.071. Since 
the law does not implicate either a suspect class or a fundamental right, then the statute need only 
survive the rational basis review. NRS 41A.071 aimed to deter frivolous malpractice suits, settling 
upon the statute to weigh the right of the plaintiff to litigate harms while incentivizing doctors to 
practice here in Nevada by lowering malpractice insurance premiums. Thus, the affidavits were 
supported by the legitimate government interest in protecting doctors against the malpractice crisis. 
 
Court access remains reasonably unfettered 
 
 Peck cited Barnes v. Eighth Judicial District Court,11 where the district court denied three 
indigent plaintiffs their NRS 12.015(1) motion to proceed with litigation without paying attorney 
fees because they did not have attorney affidavits to prove the complaints had merit. The statute 
specifically prevented indigent people from bringing a claim before the court without an attorney 
affidavit to show the case had merit. The current case is distinguishable in that NRS 41A.071 
requires all medical malpractice claims to include an expert affidavit, not just the indigent or 
inmate populations. Likewise, the right to access the judicial process is available but not unfettered, 
and requiring an expert affidavit does not unfairly hinder the indigent. Thus, NRS 41A.071 does 
not unreasonably create a suspect class. 
 
Inmates are not unconstitutionally precluded from pursuing medical malpractice claims 
 
 Peck also cited Boddie v. Connecticut12 where the Supreme Court determined that the 
imposition of court costs upon indigent plaintiffs seeking divorce violated their equal protection 
rights. Medical malpractice claims do not carry the same societal importance as marriage. 
Furthermore, Peck cited Bounds v. Smith13 because there, the Supreme Court held that inmates 
have a constitutional right of access to the courts. That right does not include an unfettered access 
to civil lawsuits within the judicial system. Instead, inmates possess a right to resources that will 
help them fight their criminal sentences and to challenge the conditions of their imprisonment.14 
Ultimately, prisoners are not a suspect class and there is no fundamental right to medical 
malpractice damages. For these reasons, the expert affidavit requirement is rationally-related to a 
legitimate government interest and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The court affirmed the district court’s holding and upheld summary judgment on behalf of 
Dr. Zipf and Dr. Barnum because Peck failed to include an expert affidavit in his claim, and his 
claim was insufficient to constitute the res ipsa loquitur exception to the expert affidavit 
requirement.  
                                                 
10  Tam, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 80, 358 P.3d at 239. 
11  103 Nev. 679, 748 P.2d 483 (1987). 
12  401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
13  430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
14  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996). 
